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The Idea of Compassion
John S. YOKOTA
 The paper discusses the Buddhist notion of compassion through an analysis and critique of 
the Mahayana doctrines of bodhisattva (enlightened beings) and upaya (skillful means). While 
it recognizes the importance of the soteriological context of the concepts considered, it pro-
poses both the possibility and necessity to look beyond this original meaning to one encom-
passing the social-historical dimension. It is only in this way can the notion of Buddhist com-
passion contribute to a discussion of salvation in the fullest sense of the word. The process 
thought influenced by A. N. Whitehead as well as the Liberal Protestant tradition have in-
fluenced the development of this discussion. 
Key Words: Buddhist Theology, History of Buddhist Thought, Buddhist social ethics, Process 
          thought, Inter-religious dialog
I Introductory Remarks
The Buddhist concept of compassion (karuna;慈悲) is a central element in the whole tradi-
tion. In personal reflections on the doctrine of Amida Buddha and on a Buddhist social ethics, it 
was inquired into and reflected upon at length and has therefore been at the center of my con-
cerns and work for some time. While the Whitehead-Hartshorne-Cobb tradition of process 
thought was never too explicit, it was, however, implicit in the development of those thoughts 
on and criticisms of traditional Buddhist conceptualizations and articulations of compassion 
and social ethics. The problem focused on and developed here is the problem of the concretiza-
tion of compassion in the history of Buddhism as it took root in a variety of societies. The image 
of this endeavor is one that re-readings of Whitehead's Adventures of Ideas have developed for 
me (thus, the title of this paper). It is both a descriptive endeavor as well as a speculative one as 
I look at the history of Buddhist thought and see how the idea of compassion has come to the 
forefront and center of the tradition. However, this idea of compassion, for some unfathomable 
reason, has rarely been fully concretized as the ideas whose adventures Whitehead so vividly 
discussed became. It is this concretization into the fabric of our social history, small and faint
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though it may be, that is assumed to be important in this discussion.
The Mahayana Buddhist concepts of bodhisattva (菩薩) and upaya (方便) are examined to
understand the dynamics of compassion. How these two ideals developed from early Buddhism 
is pursued, noting both continuities and discontinuities. As Buddhism spread and developed 
from India into far east Asian cultures and societies, these concepts evolved and affected these 
new cultures as well. From these historical foundations, I attempt to translate the material 
from times past to the problems and situations of our present-day society. By reflecting on 
Whitehead's analysis, I attempt to ameliorate the situation in the Buddhist context and present 
a more consistent, meaningful and hopefully relevant notion of compassion ever mindful of the 
concrete actualities of our present situation. Moreover, in looking at the position of process 
thought, the problem of how we apprehend this idea of compassion is also considered. Using the 
technical language of process thought, how does one prehend the eternal objects so as to get out 
of the rut of constant repetition of the past and see the possibilities of something new. Through 
such prehension, do the ideas whose adventures Whitehead discusses become actualized.
II The Bodhisattva Ideal
 The bodhisattva (one whose intent is not only for personal enlightenment but enlightenment 
for others) is a central element in the Northern or Mahayana Buddhist tradition and is usually 
compared to the arhat (one whose intent is on personal enlightenment) in the Southern or Thera-
vadin Buddhist tradition. This Mahayana ideal will be focused on noting the background and 
basic meaning of the term and ideal in the earlier strata of the whole tradition as well as the 
subsequent Mahayana development as it spread into northern and far east Asian cultures and 
societies. The main source for this discussion is a volume of essays on the bodhisattva doctrine 
based on a conference on its evolution. (Kawamura 1981) The opening essay, the inaugural ad-
dress for the conference, is the only essay in which, in a simple, straight-forward manner, the 
image of compassionate concern and activity in our daily lives that resonates with our general 
understanding of the term compassion is related. (Kawamura 1981, 1 A Catholic nun who the 
speaker knows is said to be, "...on the path to sainthood" or if she were a Buddhist, "...on the 
way to becoming a bodhisattva." for her work as a superindentent of a Catholic school system.) 
The speaker is a western trained student of Buddhism and philosophy of religion and indicates 
that he is Christian (Protestant). It is significant that a Christian trained in Buddhist thought 
made this illustrative remark. That emphasis on the actualization of and concrete expression of 
love in one's life is central to a Christian ethic. When a practicing Christian thinks of compas-
sion or love it is this concrete and everyday expression she immediately thinks of. I make this
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point because all subsequent essays do not talk of the compassionate activity of the  bodhisattva 
in such concrete and simple terms. The soteriological or spiritual emphasis is the center of the 
discussion with cosmological and metaphorical elaborations that give some of the discussions 
an other-worldly cast. It is this basic attitude or understanding of the tradition (I do not ques-
tion textual support for it) that I hope to confront and consider. 
 The word  bodhisattva has two possible meanings, a being whose essence  (sattva) is wisdom 
(bodhi) or considering the Pali expression, bodhisatta, a being whose intent (sakta) is to achieve 
wisdom. The latter meaning derives from two points or problems. While the Pali bodhisatta is 
the form found in the literature and while it is natural to assume that satta corresponds to  sat-
tva, there are other possibilities one being sakta which means  'attached to  'or  'devoted to'. The 
second problem which necessitates questioning the above assumption of satta corresponding to 
 sattva is that for the Theravada, the bodhisatta has yet to achieve enlightenment or wisdom. 
Thus, in the earlier strata of the tradition, bodhisatta is the Buddhist practitioner intent on 
wisdom and so is still on the path to wisdom. (Kawamura 1981, 21-22) 
 The term bodhisatta is found in the Jataka literature and is used to indicate the previous in-
carnations of the historical Buddha Gotama while still on the path toward the final achieve-
ment of enlightenment. (Kawamura 1981, 22-27) Although the term cannot be found in the 
earliest stratum of the tradition, its usage can be supposed to have already become current by 
the third century B. C. E. (Kawamura 1981, 24) Thus, at a relatively early point in the tradi-
tion, the use of the term bodhisatta can be discerned indicating  'historical' past lives of the 
historical Buddha Gotama as the eventual enlightened-one worked out his enlightenment over 
eons of practice. While there are numerous motifs in the literature, one major theme is the per-
formance of generous deeds of compassionate activity to benefit others. Thus, the act of doing 
good, compassionate even sacrificial deeds as one prerequisite paving the way toward enlight-
enment is related in a relatively early stage of the tradition in a popular form in rather concrete 
and unequivocal terms. 
 The Mahayana development of the  bodhisattva doctrine centers not on the trans-historical 
practitioner-incarnations of Gotama endeavoring toward his eventual enlightenment that was 
the Theravada focus, but on the equally trans-historical beings whose essence is wisdom that 
are the enlightened ones of the future. The notion of past practitioners leading to Gotama and 
his enlightenment naturally gave rise to the notion of enlightened beings in the future which 
accordingly led to the notion of beings who are presently going through practices to become 
these future Buddhas. (Kawamura 1981, 27-32) The existence of the historical Buddha Gotama, 
first, led to the assumption of past forms of existence leading to the enlightened Gotama. This 
in turn led to the assumption that there must be future enlightened ones which led finally to
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the conclusion that there must be present practitioners who will become these future enlight-
ened ones. The Mahayana emphasis turned from the past to the future and present. There is an 
added element to the Mahayana discourse which complicates but enriches the discussion. There 
also arose a tradition of the existence of a myriad of trans-historical Buddhas pre-dating Gota-
ma and therefore a myriad of practicing bodhisattvas that eventually became these Buddhas. 
The Larger Sukhavativyuha Sutra is the primary illustration of this development. 
 The concern for compassionate acts towards others is continued in the form of the transfer of 
merit accrued through practice toward the attainment of wisdom. The practitioner/enlightened 
one transfers this personally gained merit to others on the path or even to devout laypersons. 
The soteriological or narrowly religious context is clearly enunciated. This act of merit transfer-
ence is forthrightly denied by the Theravada tradition in theory. This, then, is purely a Ma-
hayana practice/doctrine closely associated with the notion of the bodhisattva. The notion of 
merit transference from the enlightened bodhisattvas (buddhas) to lay believers as well as prac-
titioners still on the path toward enlightenment became a central fixture of the developing Ma-
hayana tradition. A. L. Basham makes an interesting point that the rise of this idea of merit 
transference in the Mahayana tradition coincided with a period of general Indian resistance 
toward karma and its implacable hold on the individual. In the frightful and chaotic period 
when this doctrine was establishing itself, real compassion and aid to others could only take the 
form of freeing another from the strangling bonds of birth-and-death, in short, deliverance from 
this painful existence. The good deeds of the Theravada were considered too feeble to do any 
real good. (Kawamura 1981, 37) Thus, through this merit transferred from a bodhisattva, one 
could gain release and attain wisdom. By the first century of the common era, the compassion of 
the bodhisattva was essentially this bestowing of one's merit accrued through practice toward 
enlightenment so that the faithful could break the bonds of karma. (Kawamura 1981, 32-37) 
The earlier concrete and straightforward notion of compassionate acts related in the Jataka 
literature developed into an exclusively soteriological or spiritual notion of compassion. 
 This soteriological emphasis is important. The Buddhist notion of compassion should 
definitely be understood not merely in the common sense of the word but in the context of its 
soteriological efficacy. Nevertheless, it has been my conviction that the full sense of soteriologi-
cal efficacy must include this common sense of the word because salvation must be for the en-
tire person: body, mind and spirit. Besides, if the word compassion is to be used it should have 
some connection with its ordinary nuance or should not be used. "In his finished form the Bod-
hisattva not only helps and guides men in obvious and practical ways, but also devotes the im-
mense store of punya which he has gathered over countless ages, to their welfare." (Kawamura 
1981, 32) This statement by A. L. Basham alone can be taken in many ways and may have the
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meaning I am hoping for. Nevertheless, taking the whole context into consideration, it is the 
soteriological concern that is being emphasized with its statement of the transference of merit 
towards others' salvation. In a very interesting and in many ways important paper K. Tanaka 
makes a similar point in countering charges of a lack of ethical concern on the part of Shin Bud-
dhism. In his analysis, the soteriological emphasis is also espoused and is used to counter the 
charge of ethical disinterest on the part of true Shin followers. (Jackson and Makransky 2000, 
346-363) I will discuss this essay and point of view at more length in part 6 (p. 15). While 
religious salvation is in the end, no doubt, the most enduring and fundamental form of compas-
sionate activity, the secular salvation from real evils that can be accomplished and should be at-
tempted must also be a concern of compassionate activity. Religious salvation should include an 
awareness of this secular evil and some kind of attempt at confrontation and resolution of it. To 
borrow a Christian motif, while the good news of the Bible has a spiritual message, a social 
gospel, a gospel not merely centered on individual spiritual salvation but on a salvation both 
spiritual and secular of the larger social and global sphere, is needed and must also be declared. 
 The development of this idea of bodhisattvas and buddhas aiding one to final enlightenment 
through the transfer of merit is a central soteriological motif in the developing and developed 
Mahayana. The appearance of Maitreya (P. Metteyya), the bodhisattvalbuddha of the future, is 
already found in the Pali cannon albeit with "all the marks of lateness." (Kawamura 1981, 28) 
With the appearance of this foremost example of a future enlightened one, there arose simul-
taneously an early notion of cycles in time devolving into a period of spiritual and secular chaos 
that marks  'the end of the dharma', an intermediary eschaton leading to the appearance of 
Maitreya and the dawn of a new age and the beginning of the cycle again. In addition to this fu-
ture buddha, there are primordial buddhas like Amitabha/Amitayus who has an uncountable 
retinue of bodhisattvas among whom Avalokitesvara (Kwan-yin/Kannon) and Mahasthama-
prapta are the most famous. (Kawamura 1981, 31) The appearance of these figures of salvation, 
especially in the case of Amitabha and Avalokitesvara, in east Asian cultures, marked a decisive 
and formitable rise in a cult-worship like adoration of and appeal to these figures for salvation 
in these times of  'the end of the dharma'. The idea of compassion became central to Buddhism 
and it was this idea of soteriological and spiritual compassion that was central. Again, it 
seemed that a merely ethically centered idea of compassion offered by practitioners and enlight-
ened ones was just too feeble and useless to gain solace and reprieve from the hopelessly 
depraved situation one found oneself in. Real compassion and by extension real ethical behavior 
must be that which will gain one transcendental escape from the chaos and horror of the times. 
 The parallel with Christianity in the late Middle Ages with invocation of saints and adoration 
of a variety of relics is undeniable and reflects the social and spiritual uncertainty of the times
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and the hopelessness felt in both instances. Luther in his  'faith-alone' re-discovery and empha-
sis began a process of demystification. The soteriological emphasis, however, if anything, was 
even more emphasized. Shinran's own  'reformation' of the tradition also began the same process 
of demystification and also emphasized the soteriological orientation of compassion. Basham 
makes the point that this reliance on these figures of salvation should not be belittled from our 
modern day standpoint and indicates that the great scholar-priest Hsuan Tsang was, "...con-
stantly invok(ed)ing the Bodhisattva Kwan-yin in the face of robbers, storms or demons, and 
was invariably preserved from danger." (Kawamura 1981, 31-32) While it is important to be 
conscious of our modern-day  'prejudices' or standards as being different from those of the past, 
the need for change, if warranted, in our traditional standards must be recognized and attempt-
ed. The solely soteriological emphasis of compassion or love, for better or worse, must be re-
oriented toward our present-day emphasis on a socially aware and caring love or compassion. In 
short, the soteriological and the social-ethical positions must both be recognized. Christianity 
has been most recently conscious of this need from at least the advent of the liberal Christian 
movement that was the Social Gospel (the late 19th century onward with the 60's and 70's liber-
ation theologies being the most recent manifestations). Buddhism has not as consciously or the-
matically seen the same need. Buddhists in Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Euro-American Buddhists 
had or have begun such re-thinking of the tradition. However, the traditional schools still stress 
the soteriological or spiritual intent of compassion with scarcely a consideration of the social-
historical context. 
 The classic rejoinder to this lack of ethical concern is the Mahayana doctrine of returning to 
this world and not dwelling in or being attached to enlightenment/nirvana. One is thereby free 
to save all creatures. (Kawamura 1981, 62-64) Again, the exclusively soteriological meaning of 
saving creatures is being advanced. To the extent of my knowledge, while returning to this 
world is oft-times referred to in regard to describing what a  bodhisattva is, there is no concrete 
explanation of what is entailed by this return to this world. Indeed, I am not sure whether the 
concrete soteriological meaning of this return is really given. It is just assumed. What, indeed, 
is this compassionate saving? While I realize it is ridiculous to expect a standardized guidebook 
explaining what compassionate salvation is, demanding more concrete descriptions of the com-
passionate life is desirable and needed. What does Buddhism have to say about some of the ur-
gent issues that face our lives and planet today? Perhaps, in the example of Shin Buddhism, to 
share the joy of the life of the nembutsu with others may be the most compassionate thing to do, 
indeed, the only thing to do, (Jackson and Makransky 2000, 354-356) but is that what Shin 
Buddhism ultimately wants to say about the world we find ourselves in and how we should 
react to it? I do not think it is and will try to develop a complementary position to this soterio-
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logical answer. As a prelude to that attempt, the doctrine of upaya or skillful means will be dis-
cussed.
III The Compassion of Upaya
 The discussion of upaya will also attempt to look at the pre-Mahayana precedents for this 
central Mahayana concept and ideal of skillful means as well as the Mahayana development. 
Previous work published and unpublished on upaya and the two-truths as well as M. Pye's 
work on upaya will be the basis for the following. The title of this section connects compassion 
with upaya and is the starting point and basis of the ensuing discussion. Pye makes a good 
point, however, in commenting that while the tradition, especially in Japan, tends to see upaya 
in terms of compassion, in looking at its use in the Prajnaparanmita (wisdom) literature, skill-
ful means is necessarily connected with the working of wisdom not with compassion. (Pye 1978, 
102-117) This is important to keep in mind. Wisdom fulfilled is a wisdom used. Through the at-
tainment of wisdom, skillful means, for the first time, are skillful and effective. The wisdom at-
tained is a wisdom not content to be a self-reflective or self-absorbed wisdom but a wisdom flow-
ing out of itself. The inherent activity of wisdom is reflected in the activity to implement this 
means to be as skillful as possible. It is as if wisdom must come out of itself to express itself as 
well as possible. Pye's point is well taken, wisdom is the foundation of skillful means. Wisdom is 
active, however, and it is in this activity that wisdom and compassion become one. Wisdom is 
compassionate and compassion is wise. If this were not the case, then neither would fulfill the 
function of its meaning. 
 The pre-Mahayana use of the term upaya is quite infrequent and no real connection with the 
Mahayana usage can be confidently deduced from it. The term upaya itself has a common every 
day usage apart from its technical usage. In a carefully worked out and precise chapter on this 
topic of the pre-Mahayana existence of the doctrine, Pye says there is an underlying and primal 
notion of the idea to be found in Gotama's decision to proclaim the teaching after his enlighten-
ment. (Pye 1978, 118-137) I have personally seen this decision to teach on the part of Gotama as 
the primal event of Buddhism and thus the paradigmatic example of upaya and the expression 
of Buddhist compassion. (Hirota 2000,  81-86) Gotama himself, in all probability, did not use the 
term upaya. Yet, it is not too unreasonable to make the simple claim that he did teach about the 
content of his enlightenment and how to attain it. He did not keep it a secret, but it became pub-
lic property as it were. What is meant by saying that this is the primal event of Buddhism is 
quite literal. Buddhism began at that point and Gotama expressed its essence in the decision to 
teach and affect others. This teaching of the enlightenment is the skillful means of the enlight-
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ened one. As such, it is the prime example of compassion. What is compassion but the wisdom of 
enlightenment enlightening others about itself? The compassion of upaya that is the teaching of 
enlightenment is the compassion of the bodhisattva using varied and ingenious means to en-
lighten others. Again, the soteriological intent of compassion and by extension upaya is primary 
and undeniable. The doctrine of two truths will be introduced to help understand the dynamics 
of upaya more fully. It is also the intent to confront a problem about its nature that may be
peculiar to  Japan:  'a lie may also be skillfu
The doctrine of two truths (satya-dvaya;
1 means'
真俗二諦)
(嘘も方 便).
has a long history in the tradition and like
upaya has its roots in early Buddhism, if not in terminology then in practice. The usual sense of 
the doctrine is that the two truths or realities are: (1) ultimate reality and (2) secular or ordina-
ry, everyday reality or in different contexts provisional truth/reality. Thinking about the duali-
ty expressed in this doctrine carefully, however, there really is finally only one reality: reality 
itself and its pale and partial and thereby false constructions. Moreover, looking at the use of 
this doctrine in the history of Buddhism, we can see its similarity to the Christian doctrine of 
the two realms. Secular powers were given sanction by the Church, since they were the 
provisional reality here on earth and therefore demanded obedience. The two truths doctrine 
has been similarly interpreted. Needless to say, these sanctionings of secular powers through 
the use of religion were a result of the perversion of the doctrine. While perversions, they were 
understandable in the context of this dualistic view of reality. If a dualistic view of reality is 
offered where there is ultimate reality and its sanctioned provisional form, then the latter must 
be that which is valid in our secular world. Accordingly, the absolute is valid only in its realm of 
the trans-social and trans-historical. There is no relationship between the two truths and be-
tween their respective realms. Unfortunately, the purely soteriological understanding of com-
passion leads to such a dualistic conclusion: leave matters of heaven/ enlightenment to God/bod-
hisattvas and leave secular matters up to the people or their leaders. Because of these problems 
in the orthodox understanding of the two truths doctrine, a re-thinking is in order. 
 The off-hand remark of a teacher (UEDA Yoshifumi: How can you call them the two truths 
when one of them is ultimately false?) led to the study of the doctrine of the two truths in both 
its Indian and Chinese sources. A summation of this study was published some years after the 
actual research (Ishihara 1989). The admittedly unorthodox definition of the two truths is that 
ultimate reality is the inexpressible ultimate itself and the second, mundane, truth is the teach-
ings about this reality, the teachings of the enlightened ones, the buddha-desana. After a 
rather long time reflecting on what this designation meant and the meaning of other related 
matters, the following position on one aspect of Buddhist reality evolved. Reality is ever reveal-
ing and expressing itself. There is an active, revelatory quality about reality. Indeed, reality is
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one, yet in a variety of ways it reveals itself. The teachings of the enlightened ones are, of 
course, the most concrete expressions of this revelation, indeed, self-revelation. Moreover, there 
are other, in a real sense, more direct ways in which reality gives us an idea of itself. The use of 
process thought in my elaborations of the doctrine in part 5 will touch on these other ways a bit 
more. This outgoing character of reality, this interaction with us is a vital and central aspect of 
what reality is. This is what the doctrines of two truths, upaya, indeed, what compassion tell us 
about reality. Reality comes to us. To put it from the opposite standpoint, we grasp what reality 
is or at least we grasp aspects of what reality is from reality itself. We take in reality as it re-
veals itself to us. It is this active quality of reality that these doctrines help us to understand. 
While Pye is rather wary of an etymological analysis of the term upaya (Pye 1978, 12, 106-108) 
some Japanese scholars have referred to the root upa-i (to approach, to come near) to analyze 
the meaning of the term. I have personally found it suggestive and is the basis for the immedi-
ately preceding discussion and its language. The  'coming near' and approaching of reality is up-
aya. The skillful means of the bodhisattva, the compassion that is the topic of this paper, is 
based on this activity of reality as it approaches to reveal itself. (Yokota 1999, 29-30)
IV The Social-historical Dimensions of Compassion
 The preceding discussion of the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of upaya have shown the 
central place of compassion in the tradition. It has also shown the exclusively soteriological con-
text in which compassion is active. The influence Buddhism has had on cultures it has come in 
contact with and still influences is not negligible. Nevertheless, like most of the so-called major 
religious traditions in the world today, it has lost much of its power to hold on to its adherents 
and care for the emotional and intellectual needs of them let alone add new followers to its 
numbers. In these radically secular times, this may be understandable. Nevertheless, the un-
ease and uncertainty of many if not most people in the so-called  'advanced' societies in the 
world cry out for the kind of help that religious traditions have traditionally offered. Moreover, 
the responsibility of these societies for the chaos and destruction of the physical and spiritual 
livelihood of  'the other half of the world' needs to be acknowledged and addressed as well. The 
proposal that I offer in suggesting the emphasis on and addition of the social-historical dimen-
sion to the exclusively soteriological understanding of compassion is one way to begin a renewal 
and revival of the tradition. It is also a needed addition to help us face up to the grief we have 
caused in other parts of the world. This endeavor, of course, flies in the face of current realities. 
The central importance of the forces of inward-looking fundamentalism in the revival of 
religious traditions throughout the world cannot be denied. The social historical dimension that
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the Liberal Protestant tradition came to emphasize brought too much of the world into its 
sphere and may have diluted its message. Nevertheless, it is this liberal endeavor to be true to 
one's intellect and conscience as well as to one's emotions that is important. The question why 
the social-historical dimension should be a consideration of compassion as well as how this will 
affect our understanding of compassion will now be addressed. 
 The soteriological emphasis of compassion discussed in section two above is the basic Bud-
dhist position, indeed, other religious traditions as well, explicitly or implicitly, emphasize the 
soteriological nature of love/compassion. The three monotheistic traditions drawing inspiration 
from the Jewish Bible put equal emphasis, however, on the love of justice as well as the soterio-
logical character of acting in love. It is in this demand for justice, for good or bad, that these tra-
ditions call for acts of love. Many problems, admittedly, arise with this emphasis on justice and 
righteousness. The demand for righteousness for the wrong reasons or in the wrong hands can 
lead to a frightening witch-hunt like Puritanism. Nevertheless, the social-historical conscious-
ness while including the call for justice and righteousness also includes inherent safe-guards 
that can help guard against over-zealous or wrong-headed campaigns demanding righteous-
ness. 
 What is salvation in Buddhism? It is to become enlightened. How does one awaken to enlight-
enment? One must engage in religious practices. It is in this simple, formula-like truism of Bud-
dhism that the answer to why the social-historical dimension should be a consideration of com-
passion can be found. At the same time, this formula indicates the basic reason why there has 
been a healthy scepticism about considering compassion apart from this soteriological context. 
 The nature of the reality awoken to in the enlightenment experience is not open to simple 
description. Indeed, it is not open to any description at all. The tradition has discussed it in a 
variety of poetical, metaphorical as well as analytical ways, however. The consensus while far 
from being unanimous, can, at least from a Mahayana position, be described as a vision of inter-
penetrating, interdependent entities of existence open to each other and the whole. It is an ever-
changing flux of existence, flowing into and out of existence in a momentary flash. Yet things 
are; they are not nothing. This vision of reality implies certain things about who one is and 
about one's relationship with that in which one finds oneself that cannot be ignored. Everything 
is intimately related to one's own existence. If this is our world as seen through the insight of 
wisdom, then this wisdom dictates that we live fully conscious of the way things are and act ac-
cordingly. The  'other' being a real part of oneself should be accorded a respect and dignity we 
would expect for ourselves. To act in accord with this reality in which we live would be the way 
things should be. It is here that a basic foundation for or guideline of ethical behavior can be 
found.
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 The above was one-sidedly spatial in conceptualization. There is also a temporal inter-
relatedness that is implied by this Buddhist vision of reality. The past impinges upon the 
present and the present is impinging upon that which will be. Both spatially and temporally, 
there is no isolated entity. Both spatially and temporally every entity is in a context. Its acts in-
fluence other entities in that context and these others influence it, in turn. In such a way is the 
recognition of the social-historical context we find ourselves in fully supported by the Buddhist 
view of reality. 
 The Buddhist tradition does not necessarily see it this way, however. The descriptions of the 
enlightened state vary but one quality that is central is the claim that the enlightened one is 
freed from the restrictions of conditionedness. There is a freedom from the social-historical con-
text that all others find themselves in. One is able to rise beyond all prejudices and assumptions 
of one's age and culture and be a truly and literally free person. I have come to see this as a 
metaphor, however. It is not literally true. On the contrary, the enlightened one would seem to 
be the person who sees the full extent of one's own existence bound by the ties of history, cus-
tom, habit, yes, and even the prejudice that afflict all people. It is, paradoxily, because of know-
ing one's real state and accepting it that one becomes as free as possible in that boundedness 
thus achieving a metaphorical yet stangely real freedom. It is only when one realizes the re-
strictions and prejudices of one's social (including gender and ethnicity) and historical back-
ground that the possibility of rising beyond them becomes real. It is in this insight into who one 
is and what constitutes one's existence that a freedom in a metaphorical sense becomes possi-
ble. Literal freedom from these conditions is not possible. One carries one's social and historical 
 `baggage' wherever one goes. To achieve literal transcendence from one's social-historical con-
ditioning is religious rhetoric and should be seen as such. 
 What is salvation in Buddhism? It is to become enlightened. How does one awaken to enlight-
enment? One must engage in religious practices. It is practice that must be considered now. It is 
this element that has spawned healthy scepticism about considering compassion apart from the 
soteriological dimension. The insight that is enlightenment is soteriological in character: it is 
for one's spiritual release. This insight into the way things are is not meant to be a guidebook 
for ethical behavior. A too facile incorporation of this insight (in most cases indirect insight 
since one has not had this insight oneself but indirectly through the medium of teachings) is 
cheap ethics, not worked for at all. I acknowledge that the above and what follows is indeed 
cheap ethics, ethics bought on the cheap. Nevertheless, I see a real danger in Buddhist tenden-
cies to take a stance above ethics thus leaving the impression that anything is allowed, since in 
the end everything is the same. Moreover, institutionally, Buddhism has given its support to 
sometimes dubious attitudes and acts without too much reflection or remorse. In short, it has
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taken ethical stands which would seem to have been ethically wrong. There is a pious stance 
taken as one situates oneself artificially above ethics and the variety of decisions made and to 
be made in the social-historical realm we find ourselves in. To abstain from making such a deci-
sion and going through the struggle to see what is the best way to act is to abstain from being a 
responsible person. This is something no one should do, for whatever reason. Again, cheap 
ethics is no real alternative. Nevertheless, in this struggle to become a responsible, active mem-
ber in one's social-historical world, a form of practice, the practice of a struggling, unsure per-
son of evil passion can be engaged in. We join the struggle to lead a compassionate and good life, 
hopefully, without too many illusions.
V The Idea of Compassion
 Compassion is that which flows from the mind of enlightenment. All unenlightened ones in-
directly know what compassion is through descriptions of it. However, apart from this, we have 
an idea of compassion, learned in a variety of obvious and subtle ways through the processes of 
acculturation. Yet, where did this idea and others like it come from? Did they come from the 
struggle of human beings as they stumbled through life over the eons? Yes, but again where did 
they come from? The processes of the universe are varied and random and seem to lead mostly 
nowhere yet in this process there also seems to be some direction toward intensity and har-
mony. Again, where does this come from? The adventures of ideas is a long adventure which has 
neither beginning nor end but is a constant struggle for definition, concreteness and actualiza-
tion. Where does this force toward concretization come from? The God of process thought is not 
imposed on the system but is a necessary element needed to explain fully the system, to explain 
why things are the way they are. (Cobb 1965, 176) The randomness of nature is true, yet in this 
randomness, what direction there is comes from something beyond this randomness. This 
source is God for process thought. Each occasion of existence incorporates this aim or direction 
from this unifying principle that is God. Intensity and harmony are the basic ideals that con-
stantly seek balance in the incorporating processes of all existents. Thus, we incorporate the 
idea of compassion from God and the seeds of the idea are within us pushing us toward some 
form of actualization. Humanity has had this idea of compassion for ages sometimes actualizing 
it and sometimes ignoring it, yet it has endured and kept on claiming our attention however for 
a short time. The idea of compassion that is grasped from God is what humanity is acting out. 
To consider Amida Buddha as primarily and primordially the embodiment of compassion as the 
tradition has done can be expanded into seeing Amida as the God of process thought offering us 
a vision of compassion to actualize. Moreover, while it may be too much (and too facile), to see
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Amida as the God of process thought luring and calling us to a compassionate intensity of exis-
tence, it may be a needed creative expansion of the understanding of Amida Buddha for our tra-
dition. 
 The haphazard stumbling around that is the advance of humanity may not need outside im-
put to weave its way to the actualization of compassion, yet compassion seems neither to be in-
nate nor naturally and merely coming about through social forces. The hint of compassion is 
from compassion itself as individuals from their depths seek out a primordial compassion they 
feel in the universe. 
 Process thought has no uniform position on how God is able to be prehended (grasped) 
whereby we come to  'know' of these aims toward which we should advance. Yet prehended it is. 
(Cobb 1965, 163) The problem is that if as Whitehead insisted that one sees God as an entity of 
existence (actual entity), then God would instantly perish at the moment of actuality (satisfac-
tion). However, God is never  'finished'. Whitehead was definite in claiming that only the past, 
i.e. completed entities of existence could be prehended. Since God is ever becoming as it acts in 
and is acted upon by the world, then God can never be finished and be a past entity to be pre-
hended. Lewis Ford in a recent book has outlined the problem and several positions among 
process thinkers that attempt to deal with this problem of prehending the eternal objects ex-
tended to us from God. His own  intriguing position, in many ways, turns the problem around, 
yet offers, I believe a viable alternative. In searching for the prehensibility of God, process 
thinkers have the option to look to the present or past. 
 Charles Hartshorne's position of seeing God prehensible in the past has been the most in-
fluential solution involving, however, the rejection of Whitehead's insistence that God is an ac-
tual entity. Cobb like Hartshorne, sees God not as an actual entity but "...as a living person. A 
living person is a succession of moments of experience with special continuity." (Cobb 1965, 188) 
Ford amplifies Hartshorne's position thusly, "Each divine occasion fully prehends all those oc-
casions that have just come into being, as well as prior divine occasions. Since each divine occa-
sion, like every other actual occasion, integrates and unifies its many prehensions into one de-
terminate satisfaction, this satisfaction may be prehended by succeeding generations of occa-
sions. Thus, not only God's primordial orderings but God's particular responses to particular 
situations can be communicated to the creatures." (Ford 2000, 187) Thus, God can be prehend-
ed in the satisfaction of each successive moment of the unending series of actual entities that 
make up the living person that is God. It is in this prehension of the past and therefore prehen-
sible moments in the everlastingness of God that one can come to grasp the aims that God calls 
us to. Whitehead himself explicitly rejects the option of thinking of God as a society, however. 
(Ford 2000, 187) Ford notes a number of objections both from within Hartshorne's own positions
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as well as from relativity physics. (Ford 2000, 190-205) His principle objection is, however, 
based on the unexamined assumption that God's effectiveness in the world is posited on God's 
prehensibility. Moreover, he sees this objectification of God undercutting God's pure subjectivi-
ty. (Ford 2000, 190) The option of prehending the present has many proponents, but Marjorie 
Suchocki's creative attempts to see God as reversing the process of becoming through a reversal 
of the physical and mental poles is in many ways representative of them while being interest-
ingly creative. The usual process of becoming and coming to satisfaction in actual entities is 
that becoming leads to satisfaction, but the actual entity God proceeds from satisfaction to be-
coming. Thus, though God is forever becoming, God can be prehended in its primordial satisfac-
tion, and therefore, the eternal objects can be prehended into the becoming actual entities. 
Ford's objections while rather technical essentially object to the static nature of that which is 
prehended. (Ford 2000, 156-166) 
 Ford personally chooses to see God as future and thus as imprehensible. "(By the "imprehen-
sibility of God" I mean the totality of God as the integration of physical and conceptual feelings, 
for while Whitehead recognized the imprehensibility of divine physical feeling he affirmed that 
God as primordial could be prehended.)...There are many other modifications entailed by my al-
ternative, including the dissolution of the primordial nature, but the reaffirmation of divine 
everlasting concrescence is most central to my endeavor. It is the most radical form of pure be-
coming." (Ford 2000, 190) 
 It is this imprehensible future that nevertheless influences our decisions. We are always 
going toward the unfufilled future and so fulfilling it as we go. (Ford 2000, 240-263) I must ad-
mit to not fully understanding Ford's position, since he discusses the perhaps incomprehensi-
ble. The truly indefinite and unfixed future in the pure becoming of God is truly imprehensible 
and by definition not open to full expression. He notes his position's similarity to that of Wol-
fhart Pannenberg's idea of the future. Pannenberg sees the resurrection of Jesus as the prolep-
tic yet fulfilled act of the future. Ford, in note to me, wrote that he does not fully agree with 
Pannenberg. I would imagine it is precisely in this fulfilled nature of the future that he finds 
fault. (Ford 2000, 303-305) For Ford, there is no idea of the future in this fixed sense, it is total-
ly open and ever becoming and it is in this radical openness and uncertainty that the promise of 
the future is truly active. It is, therefore, imprehensible. In his repeated caution about our hu-
man-centered projections onto the future, I think we find one reason for this radical openness of 
the future he adheres to. The idea of compassion is much like this. It is the  unfufilled toward 
which we are pulled to fulfill. It is not our idea but the idea of the universe and so must be 
sought out and fulfilled. This open-ended quality of the imprehensible God seems to concur with 
the relative power of God inherent to the conceptuality of process thought. We are called to a
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compassion that no one entity can actualize and so in conjunction with God/Amida we work 
toward that ever-becomingness that is the ideal. 
 I must think about Ford's position and my own interpretation more. What had always been 
the source of uncertainty for me in process thought was this idea of the prehensibility of the 
eternal objects on the part of actual entities in the process of concretion. The imprehensibility of 
God while turning the problem around seems to offer a way to see a future radically disconnect-
ed from the past and thus offering real novelty to break away from the rut of mere repetition. 
The Buddhist idea of compassion would certainly be a break-through novelty if ever actualized. 
This radical uncertainty of the future would seem to fit in well with certain Buddhist ideas of 
the future. Moreover, in Ford's discussion of time, the unilinear notion need not be the only way 
to understand time in Whitehead. Ford's freely flowing direction of time would seem to be quite 
amenable to some Buddhist notions of time as well.
VI Epilogue: Notes on the Emphasis of the Concretization of Compassion 
        in Recent Studies
 While I had stated that the ethics of compassion were not concretely evident in the tradition, 
there has been some interesting, recent work beginning to rectify the situation. In a volume of 
essays on engaged Pure Land Buddhism, two papers were of special interest. The first by T. 
Unno, while a survey of a variety of issues that Pure Land Buddhism must face, notes the so-
cial-historical dimension inherent in the present situation of Pure Land Buddhism both in 
Japan and in North America. He calls for an in-depth look at the past record of the Honganji 
and its need to reflect on and repent for its mistakes so it can go on to the future in a more 
vigorous and confident manner (vigorous and confident because it has done the right thing). For 
the Honganji missions, they must reflect on their insular ethnicity and see how they want to be 
and must be in the future. This includes reflecting on the continued adherence to the Edo era 
Shugaku dogmatics in these times and in these new places. He assumes we must investigate 
new ways to think about and develop the teachings. (Tanaka and Nasu 1998, 3-26) M. Unno in 
the same volume writes on SUEKAWA Hiroshi and his form of engaged Pure Land Buddhism. 
Suekawa, as an opponent of the Pacific War, felt that he must leave his post at Kyoto Imperial 
University in protest over the firing of a colleague for anti-war sentiments. Later in life, becom-
ing rector of Ritsumeikan University he took action in attempting to stop the riot police from 
coming on campus during the student sit-ins of the late sixties and early seventies. The portrait 
that Unno paints of this scholar is one of applied and engaged compassion. (Tanaka and Nasu 
1998, 67-87) The paper noted above in part 2 (p. 5) by K. Tanaka while, again, an important
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paper in many ways, mistakenly takes the charge of lack of concern for others or a lack of an 
ethical sense in Buddhism in a way that the assertion of teaching others the name of Amida so 
as to gain salvation to be an apt rejoiner. This is no different than fundamentalist Christians 
saying that bringing the good news of the gospel to those who do not have it as being an ethical 
good. It is condescending. The stress on soteriology is important and basic. Nevertheless, one 
must be wary of this and this alone being an expression of ethical concern and action. The so-
cial-historical awareness that are apparent in the two Unno papers is lacking. It is this con-
sciousness that is necessary as we look again at our tradition and try to make it concretely con-
cerned and caring about the world around it. 
 The idea of compassion nudges us personally and nudges us as a whole to concretize it in our 
religious lives, yes, but also into the social-historical realm that we all must participate. This 
we should do in an open, caring and, yes, compassionate way 
Note: An early draft of Part 5 was presented at the annual meeting of the Japan Society for 
Process Studies, October 8, 2000. 
Note on non-English terms: Those terms that have not become familiar in English appear itali-
sized but without their diacritical marks 
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